Presidential Decree, Revolution, and National Personality
IF history is only one damned thing after another, it is certain that the results of the reconstruction efforts of past events cannot stimulate academic and political debate, even philosophical. If this is the case, we can easily memorize July 5, 1959 as a time when President Soekarno issued a decree stating that the 1950 Provisional Constitution no longer applies and Indonesia resumed using the 1945 Constitution. That date was remembered without any emotional or intellectual stimulation. In this atmosphere, we can also memorize that on 10 November 1945 the city of Surabaya was bombed by Allied troops on a large scale, and on 19 December 1948 the Dutch army succeeded in occupying Yogyakarta and capturing the president, vice president and several cabinet members. All is just a series of events without any meaning. All are just a series of events that come and pass just like that.
However, unfortunately, history is not merely a series of events. There are certain criteria or criteria that cause an event to be recorded as a historical event, and from those recorded there are also those that are treated as something important. More importantly, events that were deemed important were often also subjected to various forms of evaluation and interpretation. The level of significance of the events chosen to "enter history" is usually seen in relation to the events that happened before, and with the various events that came later. If it is considered important then that event is also often used as a boundary from the "before" and the "after". It often also happens that events that are considered "important" are subject to judgments and interpretations that originate from outside history - whether from theoretical and philosophical, or ideological presumptions - and even from political interests.
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DEBATE about the meaning or significance of historical events is common, because people want to also take wisdom and wisdom from that event. At least that is the case from the point of view that says history as a picture of the behavior of society and humans. But it is not impossible, with the submission of an historical event, people want to get a basis for legitimacy for political claims or, possibly, ideological. Or, on the contrary, that event might also be used as proof of something to deny.
Therefore, it is not surprising that many people also see the events of July 5, 1959 as the beginning of the era of authoritarianism and centralism in the country. Hasn't the presidential decree been issued since the legislative body has been practically powerless to face executive power? Isn't it true that since then the push for centralization has been getting stronger and stronger too? The stronger the government, the more authoritarianism gets stronger, and the stronger the centralization of power. This continued until the fall of the Keprabon last May 1998. On the other hand, it certainly does not need to be considered an oddity if there are those who persist with the opinion that that date symbolically marked the beginning of Indonesia's success in rediscovering its "national personality".
This view was not only said by the originator of the idea of "guided democracy", Bung Karno, but also by foreign scientists. In his long commentary on Herbert Feith's book (The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia), Harry Benda practically thought so. Because he said that the birth of Guided Democracy could be seen as a time when Indonesia returned to its authentic historical path. It's just that by saying this Benda seem to want to also emphasize that democracy is not one of the characteristics of Indonesian culture. So don't be surprised if there are also foreign researchers who refer to the Guided Democracy system as "New Mataram". However, if there are people who prefer to see the incident in accordance with the title of the President's speech on August 17, 1959 which says that "returning to the 1945 Constitution" is a sign of "the rediscovery of our Revolution", of course it is understandable too.
We do not need to debate whether or not this diverse interpretation is correct. It's just one of the general trends in the historical debate is that the more often the meaning of an "event" is debated, the more important is its place in historical reconstruction. If you have this, various hypothetical and theoretical questions are usually also asked about events that are considered important. Is, for example, the events of July 5, 1959 an inevitable "historical necessity"? Or, perhaps, this event was a "historical accident", which should not have happened? Or, perhaps the event was nothing more than an example of a constitutional denial of a power system? Whatever the answer may be given, what is certain is that immediately after that event
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IF the July 5, 1959 incident is reviewed again, an inevitable conclusion is that the event is the climax of a series of socio-political crises that has intensified since the results of two 1955 Elections - one for Parliament and one for the Constituent Assembly - announced. Whatever may be the nature of the Presidential Decree, what is certain is that after it was announced Indonesia would no longer be the same as it had been before. The event stands as a symbolic boundary between the political order before and afterwards. Since then Sukarno had relative freedom to realize his political policies, as Head of State and Government.
It might be ironic, but since then he has been more free to carry out intensification of his role as national leader. Constitutionally he is the Head of State of a presidential political system and, as he also likes to say, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but he prefers to call himself the Connector of the People's Tongue and the Great Leader of the Revolution.
So, whatever style may be a historical or political assessment of Guided Democracy, it must also be empirically said that in this episode Soekarno consciously made himself a fusion of constitutional legitimacy with ideological necessity and validity. Therefore, perhaps it is not too much to say that from the point of view of the historical study of the Guided Democracy episode it can also be treated as a "laboratory" for the investigation of Sukarno's leadership, as the Head of State / Government and as the leader of the nation. Can the two support each other? Or maybe tackle each other? If so, which one is louder to speak out?
The period leading up to the July 5 Presidential Decree is one of the most populous episodes in our contemporary history. In about two years, so many events that appeared repeatedly even coincided with one another. Perhaps only "Habibie's transitional period" (May 1998-October 1999) can rival the density of this episode. It all started with the results of the 1955 Election which apparently failed to lay the foundation of political stability. This election only results in a balance of power of parties that compete politically in Parliament and which are ideologically opposed in the Constituent Assembly. This election also shows that politically and ideologically Indonesia consists of Java, which is dominated by the Indonesian National Party (PNI), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and outside Java, which are mostly located in behind Masyumi. This "Islamic modernist" party is not only the only party to get seats in all electoral districts, but also to be the winner in ten out of 15 constituencies.
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IN the context of a state system which requires debate on socio-political issues to be resolved in parliament and the basic problems of the state and constitution in the Constituent Assembly, "clumsiness" in political dynamics is inevitable. A party can find compatibility with other parties in parliament, but it is in a different camp in the Constituent Assembly or vice versa.
In this atmosphere of political intensification Hatta realized that he could no longer cooperate with Sukarno. He placed his position as Vice-President (December 1956) and symbolically eliminated "representatives" outside Java in the national top leadership. The Ali Sastroamidjojo II Cabinet, which is a coalition of the PNI-Masyumi-NU and several small parties, was finally unable to withstand the political storm that occurred in his body.
In the atmosphere of this cabinet crisis President Sukarno felt the need to appoint an ordinary "citizen", who happened to be named Sukarno and also happened to be a president, as a cabinet formation. In the midst of accusations of unconstitutional actions, a cabinet of experts led by Djuanda was formed. But constitutional and political debates are increasingly ascending. The efforts of the Djuanda Cabinet to hold a national reconciliation, by seeking the possibility of Hatta's return to government failing to fall apart.
The Sukarno assassination attempt at the Cikini school not only caused a human tragedy, but also a political event that thwarted a "dual" unification effort. The West Irian conflict increased with the "taking over" of Dutch companies by labor organizations, which were directly or not affiliated with the PKI. The government was forced to nationalize. So thousands of Dutch citizens left Indonesia, with all the economic damage it caused.
Government Regulation No. 10 which prohibits Chinese descendants from trading in rural areas not only caused their exodus - especially from West Java - but also RI's tensions with China. Meanwhile the regional-center conflict was also sharpened. In the next process the boundaries between regional desires with political and ideological conflict became blurred, as did the blurring between political debate and political terror, which was experienced by opponents of the "President's conception".
It was in this atmosphere that military dissidents in Sumatra issued an ultimatum demanding the replacement of the Juanda Cabinet with a cabinet led by Hatta and / or Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. The rejection of the ultimatum left them with no choice but to proclaim PRRI. And Permesta soon followed. The PRRI / Permesta estimate that the central government was finally willing to negotiate, turned out to be a mere dream. Military operations were launched and by the middle of 1958 it was apparent that the rival government based in West Sumatra was no longer a serious threat. Meanwhile the various political forces were thickened, with Sukarno as its axis. Then only two possibilities remain, namely pro or anti-Sukarno.
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SO-to shorten the story-when President Soekarno was finally persuaded by Nasution's argument to "return to the 1945 Constitution", Indonesia has gone through various features of the crisis, ranging from regional-center relations and parties' conflict in the central government to international conflicts.
When the July 5 Decree was issued, Sukarno and the Indonesian Army were the most important political forces. The conflict between the president and the TNI that occurred in the "October 12 Incident" (1952) has given both of them valuable lessons. With his famous statement - "I do not want to be a dictator" - the president rejected the demands of the Indonesian Army to dissolve parliament, which they considered to have interfered too much with internal military affairs.
Since then Sukarno increasingly realized that his position as Head of State, which was said to be "can do no wrong", was not an appropriate role for him. Since then, AH Nasution began to think of an appropriate place for the military and the constitution that promised political stability. With historical arguments he proposed the 1945 Constitution and with historical arguments he also found a "middle ground" for the military. The opportunity to realize that came in various political radicalization turmoil.
The expropriation of several Dutch companies by laborers caused the government to nationalize and assign the Army to run them. The Army got a chance to "get acquainted with the business world". The PRRI / Permesta rebellion, which provoked foreign intervention while increasing the authority of the TNI and Sukarno. The success of the TNI in overcoming the threat of the PRRI / Permesta and the implementation of the SOB, the war danger law, has not only made the TNI AD under Nasution increasingly consolidated, but also increasingly a political force that must be taken into account.
Meanwhile, since the formation of the Djuanda Cabinet's zaken and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the elected parliament, the parties have experienced a remarkable setback. The Democratic League which was born by several party figures in protest against the dissolution of parliament could only last a short time. Masyumi, the party that most "irritated" Sukarno, and PSI, was dissolved (1960), arguing that there were figures from both parties involved in the PRRI / Permesta. But the PKI, which was outside the arena of the political elite at the center of government, because of the rejection of other parties and the military, step by step succeeded in working on the grassroots.
In the regional elections held in 1957 on Java, the PKI indicated that this party had become the largest. More importantly during the years of political crisis, under the leadership of a young and pragmatic, PKI managed to get closer to Sukarno. This party always appears as a defender and supporter of President Soekarno's political and ideological lines. Conversely, however much the Army might want to hamper the PKI's advance, the president always appeared as a defender. If necessary, President Soekarno was willing to officially open the PKI Congress which was obstructed by the Indonesian Army.
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Therefore, the Guided Democracy was marked by the increasingly strong political position of Sukarno, the Army, and the PKI. The most difficult problems faced by Sukarno were ensuring military loyalty, maintaining PKI political support, and blocking the possibility of an open conflict between the Army and PKI. How is the balance of these two great powers without letting one weak? However the TNI must be a respected force at home and abroad. Isn't the struggle of West Irian increasing? Is it not true that the threat of anti-revolutionary forces, as formulated by the Manipol-USDEK (a political document that Sukarno said was "the Pancasila hadith") is still haunting? On the contrary the PKI was not only a revolutionary force that Sukarno believed was "able to be tamed", but also a party which he considered could understand the orientation of his thought.
The empirical reason for the enactment of the Presidential Decree on July 5 is that the Constituent Assembly has failed to get 2/3 of votes to determine Indonesia to return to the 1945 Constitution. But in his famous speech, The Discovery of Our Revolution, which was conveyed at the anniversary of independence it appears that there are two reasons main, which has long been an obsession with Bung Karno.
First, that liberal democracy is against "national personality". In his speech, he reiterated his speech on independence day 1957. "Our democracy is democracy, which" - while saying it in Dutch - "leaves nothing but freedom itself". That is why our democracy must be "state-centric, not that which brings people into ego-centric or group-centric or party-centric or chronic-centric". Then the desired democracy is guided in accordance with the nation's lofty traditions, namely "deliberation and consensus".
Second, repeating the old theme is "the revolution is not over". This theme is the hardest thick in this speech. "This is the logic of the revolution," said Bung Karno, "once we have started we must continue until all of his ideals are realized. This is the absolute law of the revolution, which is indisputable, indisputable. Therefore don't say 'The revolution is over', even though the revolution is still ongoing ". He also stressed the "multicomplex" Indonesian revolution, or - as, he said, called a foreign scientist - "a summing-up of many revolutions in one generation".
These two ideological concepts - "multicomplex revolutions" - and "national personalities" are not new, but are issued as supporters of decrees, both of which can function as a breakthrough for political break-even. The Discovery of Our Revolution was issued when ideological discourse was in a deadlock and at the time of the basic debate the country was experiencing traffic jams. However, although both pairs of ideologies can be very persuasive for those who are bored with an increasingly barren democratic system, both concepts clearly show the attitude of Soekarno's political anti-pluralism.
In essence, these two concepts are hegemonic and anti-discourse. How can it be resisted with the concept of "national personality", however vague, without being overshadowed by the threat of accusations of "not nationalist". How will the discourse of "revolution not finished" be faced without the threat of accusation of being reactionary? In this increasingly hegemonic discourse, it is not too difficult to guess which groups of people have begun to lose confidence in the parliamentary system which is too inclined to interfere in all matters. Nor is it too difficult to estimate, which group or party sees the two pairs of discourse as a vehicle that might free it from the remoteness of the distribution of power.
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Applied to political systems and behavior, the concept of revolution gives the TNI a congenial atmosphere, according to their historical claims. Ask heroic questions about the national revolution, then who will benefit ideologically? After the Republican leaders were taken prisoner by the Dutch, who would continue the struggle, if not the TNI? Is not also the TNI always say that they come from the people, and therefore will forever inhale the values that live among the people. So why don't they support the concept of "national personality"? However Bung Karno was not only a national leader and ideologist, he was also the President / Supreme Commander. If so, the President also has a number of power tools to prevent loyalty
* Taufik Abdullah : Sejarawan
Writing source: Hundred Years of Soekarno (Kompas Special Coverage) June 1, 2001 Edition
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